tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8137988136860941398.post1633868996412510986..comments2024-03-10T05:02:00.377-07:00Comments on Sprachlogik: Deduction and the Necessary A PosterioriTristan Hazehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/18008340011384137776noreply@blogger.comBlogger5125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8137988136860941398.post-82647403697762706632023-06-04T03:01:32.078-07:002023-06-04T03:01:32.078-07:00kd shoes
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'I cannot s...Hi Gabe, thanks for the feedback.<br /><br />'I cannot see how:<br /><br />“This may suggest that, according to some intuitive and central concept of deduction, some facts about what can be deduced from what are empirical (i.e. not knowable a priori).”<br /><br />follows.'<br /><br />Maybe this will help: I did not mean to suggest that the mere (2)-likeness or (3)-likeness of the argument all by itself might suggest the above. It's that, together with Kripke's idea that it is not <i>a priori</i> that cats are animals.<br /><br />The line of thought could be crudely reconstructed this way: 'If it's valid to go straight from "There's a cat here" to "There's an animal here", because cats are necessarily animals, and if I know this only empirically, then I cannot know <i>a priori</i> that the argument is valid.'<br /><br />* * * <br /><br />The below is perhaps a bit less likely to be helpful, but it might be:<br /><br />Your way of not seeing a puzzle, if I can put it that way, seems to involve the sort of fine-grained way of thinking about content I alluded to.<br /><br />The reason why this may be puzzling if one isn't ready to switch between different granularities is the following: in other contexts we treat, e.g., a pair of people one of whom thinks cats are animals, another of whom thinks they are not, as differing over a single proposition - and yet one may have a cat-animal connection, another not. Here we need to go more coarse-grained (if we want to avoid saying that it's simply wrong in every sense that these two people disagree about some single proposition or content).<br /><br />* * *<br /><br />I didn't really understand the directionality point.Tristan Hazehttp://crystalcityaviators.bandcamp.com/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8137988136860941398.post-67682715594764439222011-10-12T01:20:20.091-07:002011-10-12T01:20:20.091-07:00I like the idea that (2) and (3)-like interpretati...I like the idea that (2) and (3)-like interpretations are ‘natural enough’. Although I don’t myself think (3)-like interpretations are all that natural, I do think (2)-like interpretations are plausible, especially if your particular therapeutic wants lead you to consider whatever seems unarticulated in the original inference as “part of the deductive apparatus”.<br /><br />But I cannot see how:<br /><br />“This may suggest that, according to some intuitive and central concept of deduction, some facts about what can be deduced from what are empirical (i.e. not knowable a priori).”<br /><br />follows. I’ve read the lead up to it a few times over, but I cap out at the very point where I should be seeing what you mean. Some more explanation on this point would be helpful (to me).<br /><br />As for the puzzle, suppose the ‘unarticulated principle of reasoning’ to be ‘determination’: where p determines q iff for p to occur is for q to occur not simpliciter, but in some particular way. I’m sure this could be worked out more exactly (my rendering is ‘clunky’, we might say), but I am trying to suggest that we can come up with some general principle of reasoning that lets us know that whenever a determinate occurs (i.e. something is scarlet) then a determinable occurs (i.e. something is red) and that this is purely a logical matter.<br /><br />To my mind this explains why “the argument by itself satisfies the natural (admittedly problematic) modal characterization of validity”” because for p to occur (at some possible world) is for q to occur (there) not simpliciter, but in some particular way.<br /><br />With this in place the puzzle doesn’t seem so puzzling. I can 1) keep an empirically defeasible conceptual connection between my ‘cat-concept’ and my ‘animal-concept’ (i.e. determination) and I can 2) “think of this conceptual connection as partly constitutive of the content of thoughts involving these concepts - thoughts such as 'There is a cat here' and 'There is an animal here'.”<br /><br />But neither 1) nor 2) forces me to hold that my ‘animal-concept’ implies my ‘cat-concept’ a priori, because determination, no matter how clunkily defined, is a one-way necessitation relation. My ‘animal-concept’ implies my ‘living organism-concept’ but not vice versa, and my ‘cat-concept’ implies my ‘animal-concept’ but not vice versa.<br /><br />So yes, while the conceptual connection of determination is partly constitutive of the content of thoughts such as ‘There is a cat here’ and ‘There is an animal here’ I don’t see that the thought ‘There is an animal here’ conceptually includes the thought ‘There is a cat here’. It seems more correct to hold that the part of the content of the thought ‘There is an animal here’ which we attribute to the conceptual connection (determination) is that ‘an animal is occurring, not simpliciter, but in a certain way’.<br /><br />And surely that doesn’t make any particular animal (here) a cat.Gabenoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8137988136860941398.post-26404071700731191432011-10-11T05:39:01.580-07:002011-10-11T05:39:01.580-07:00I guess it's not so much about saying whether ...I guess it's not so much about saying whether the argument should be interpreted according to (1), (2) or (3), but more that (2)- and (3)-like interpretations of this and other arguments seem natural enough (as *possible* interpretations, if you like), and this may give rise to the puzzle outlined in the third last paragraph.Tristan Hazehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18008340011384137776noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8137988136860941398.post-42230315316316716172011-10-11T04:52:30.085-07:002011-10-11T04:52:30.085-07:00I'm not quite sure I get the puzzle -- maybe y...I'm not quite sure I get the puzzle -- maybe you sympathise here anyway. Why not take a "therapeutic" route and say that the question posed isn't really asking anything unless, say, a token of the given argument is paired with enough information (e.g. contextual) to push towards an answer like (1), (2), (3), etc. It seems that the nature of the question simply underdetermines warrant in answering it.Jhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13670077764560134956noreply@blogger.com