tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8137988136860941398.post4542000815834417223..comments2024-03-10T05:02:00.377-07:00Comments on Sprachlogik: Against Quine's Argument in Sect. 31 of Word and ObjectTristan Hazehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/18008340011384137776noreply@blogger.comBlogger4125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8137988136860941398.post-24164968675051721052012-01-12T21:53:05.590-08:002012-01-12T21:53:05.590-08:00Thanks for the link and for your interest!Thanks for the link and for your interest!Tristan Hazehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18008340011384137776noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8137988136860941398.post-88451737739396325972011-12-25T23:06:56.042-08:002011-12-25T23:06:56.042-08:00Hey Tristan, I tried to clear up my thoughts on th...Hey Tristan, I tried to clear up my thoughts on this. It still ended up being a long ramble, and I think we pretty much agree actually. If you have the time, I posted it on my blog because of its length: http://www.over-analytics.blogspot.com/2011/12/where-does-quines-argument-against.htmlAdam Rhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00405687006837928990noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8137988136860941398.post-61103441880207169272011-12-21T23:03:25.478-08:002011-12-21T23:03:25.478-08:00Adam,
Thanks for commenting.
You write: 'Dus...Adam,<br /><br />Thanks for commenting.<br /><br />You write: 'Dusting off the principle of charity, it seems that the only way to make the 'acumen hypothesis' less silly is by taking it to stipulate that(i) Tom has the OPAQUE belief of 'if p then #p = 1 & if ~p then #p = 0' (if this is a transparent belief, then Tom may only opaquely believe the sentence 'if p then 1 = 1 & if ~p then 0 = 0', which is not very informative!), and also that(ii)Tom has the OPAQUE belief of '#(Dcc) = 1'.'<br /><br />Firstly, I think this goes beyond what one could call a charitable reading of <i>what Quine meant</i> - it seems like an amendation of Quine's argument.<br /><br />Anyway, what of this new argument? I'm not sure I follow it completely, but I take your point that assuming that Tom <i>opaquely</i> believes that #(Dcc) = 1, we can indeed make a quotational step, to: Tom believes '#(Dcc) = 1'.<br /><br />But I don't see how that enables one to run an argument which shows what Quine was trying to show with his invalid argument. Can you see a way?Tristan Hazehttp://crystalcityaviators.bandcamp.com/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8137988136860941398.post-91720022739901662011-12-18T05:48:19.443-08:002011-12-18T05:48:19.443-08:00The following might be useful, might be rambling g...The following might be useful, might be rambling garbage:<br /><br />It is true that the transparent belief that p does not entail the (opaque) belief of every sentence expressing p. <br /><br />This even holds under Quine's behaviouristic view of beliefs (or at least belief-acription). Grant a simplified version of this view where Tom believes the sentence 'p' iff Tom assents to 'p'. Suppose Tom does this. Hold Tom's theory T fixed, and let 'q' be interchangeable with 'p' in T without changing the verification conditions of T. Does Tom believe that q? Well, if we make an opaque belief-ascription to Tom, then the answer is 'no'--that 'p' and 'q' are interchangeable in T does not mean that 'q' is in T. If we make a transparent belief-ascription to Tom, then the answer is 'yes'--it is a fact that 'p' and 'q' are indeed interchangeable in T. So transparent belief that q does not imply opaque belief of 'q'.<br /><br />But keep Quine's treatment of beliefs in mind and run through the steps of the argument again. <br /><br />Let 'Dcc' = 'Cicero denounced Catiline'. Firstly, Tom transparently believes that #(Dcc) = 1. What does this mean? It is consistent with Tom having only the opaque belief that 1 = 1, since Dcc is in fact true, meaning that '#(Dcc)' is interchangeable with '1'. In other words, it is consistent with Tom assenting to the sentence '1 = 1' but NOT the sentence '#(Dcc) = 1'. But then the 'acumen' hypothesis is just too silly. If Tom assents to '1 = 1', why would we predict that he would also assent to '#(Dcc) = 1', let alone 'Dcc'?<br /><br />Dusting off the principle of charity, it seems that the only way to make the 'acumen hypothesis' less silly is by taking it to stipulate that(i) Tom has the OPAQUE belief of 'if p then #p = 1 & if ~p then #p = 0' (if this is a transparent belief, then Tom may only opaquely believe the sentence 'if p then 1 = 1 & if ~p then 0 = 0', which is not very informative!), and also that(ii)Tom has the OPAQUE belief of '#(Dcc) = 1'.<br /><br />This last stipulation, (ii), is central to your counter-argument as I see it. I.e., a transparent belief that #(Dcc) = 1 does not imply the opaque belief of '#(Dcc) = 1'. As I have said, it is consistent with Tom only having the opaque belief that '1 = 1'. So if there is reason to believe that Quine's 'acumen hypothesis' involves stipulating (ii), then his argument is not invalid (even though it might not be very interesting). <br /><br />But consider that for Quine, when we ascribe a belief of any kind to Tom, we do so on the basis of his behaviour--in my simplified version, his assent to sentences. So if we are to say that Tom TRANSPARENTLY believes that #(Dcc) = 1, then we do so by virtue of (inter alia) his assenting to some sentence or other (which could just be '1 = 1'), and then deciding on interpreting this behaviour in line with transparent belief (similar, it should be said, to how some people use 'de re' beliefs--this perhaps not being as appropriate for Quine). We could just as easily have decided to interpret it in line with opaque belief. <br /><br />But if we grant stipulation (i), why would we then have any reason to think that Tom would believe 'Dcc' just because (i) holds (he opaquely believes the sentence expressing the conditions of #p), together with him opaquely believing '1 =1'. We don't have any such reason. It seems to me that in order to avoid an absurdity that must have been just as obvious to Quine, we must assume that the sentence Tom assents to (and thus opaquely believes), such that we subsequently interpret that assent behaviour in line with transparent belief-ascription, is the sentence '#(Dcc) = 1'. If this seems reasonable (or charitable), then the argument does not stumble into invalidity on the way to a supressed quotational step.Adam Rhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00405687006837928990noreply@blogger.com