tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8137988136860941398.post7015310226332458804..comments2024-03-10T05:02:00.377-07:00Comments on Sprachlogik: 'Metaphorical Truth'? Three Frontiers for a Sharper Metalinguistic Negotiation ToolkitTristan Hazehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/18008340011384137776noreply@blogger.comBlogger2125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8137988136860941398.post-5386781287132823662018-03-15T16:17:35.544-07:002018-03-15T16:17:35.544-07:00In addition to the articles cited above, just out ...In addition to the articles cited above, just out in the journal Erkenntnis is an article by Inga Vermeulen, "Verbal disputes and the varieties of verbalness" (Erkenntnis (2018) 83:331-348).<br /><br />https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s10670-017-9892-4?wt_mc=alerts.TOCjournals<br /><br />JPLAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8137988136860941398.post-3262213878730303122018-03-14T18:53:34.059-07:002018-03-14T18:53:34.059-07:00Before reading the Chalmers, Plunkett and Thomasso...Before reading the Chalmers, Plunkett and Thomasson articles, may I take as an example the term 'truth' as used in philosophy? If you have a given single sentence s1, let's say a simple descriptive claim, and the sentence has, among others, a "literal" (or better "normal") sense and a "metaphorical" sense, then, since the important relation is the one between the sense of the sentence and the objective situation referred to (the referential aspects of a descriptive sentence include more than just the subject NP, and I think Frege, e.g., allowed that), you make a judgment wrt each sense: s1 in sense 1 may be false, while s1 in sense 2 may be true. In the case of each sense, how is it determined whether or not that sense meets the criteria of "truth" with relation to the situation referred to? The notion (category) of 'truth' used must be able to evaluate both cases while also making the distinction, since metaphor is a ubiquitous feature of language use. It is not possible to understand the phenomenon of metaphor without an adequate understanding of the relation of reference. Any notion of truth that is to be used to evaluate cases such as the sentence with literal and metaphorical senses must involve evaluation of the reference relation for the two senses, as well as the appropriateness of the language used (linguistic system). The notion of 'truth' used by Tarski, Davidson or other formal semanticists can not do this. A precondition is an adequate notion of 'reference', and this requires getting rid of the restriction to definite subject NPs (an artifact of the old subject- predicate as reference- predication conception from traditional grammar) and recognizing that the entire core propositional content of a descriptive sentence, e.g., has a referential relation to an intentional object outside of the linguistic act of meaning. So, the terms 'reference' and 'truth' as theoretical notions have to be adjusted in order to handle the epistemic demand of figuring out how language "hooks onto the world", to use Putnam's phrase. You can't answer this kind of question using formal modeling.<br /><br />JPLAnonymousnoreply@blogger.com