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Saturday, 2 November 2019

‘Two Recent Theories of Conditionals’ vs. Two Recent Theories of Conditionals

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The tide is beginning to turn against counterintuitive theories of indicative conditionals which either deny them truth-values or give t...
8 comments:
Saturday, 17 August 2019

Imaginary Foundations, the Zombie Argument, and Modal Inertness

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Recently published work by Wolfgang Schwarz, to an extent I'd thought impossible, offers an explanation of why there seem to be facts of...
3 comments:
Saturday, 25 May 2019

Logical Pluralism

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In this post I will raise an issue for the logical pluralism of Beall & Restall (hereafter 'B&R') - a much-discussed, topic-...
2 comments:
Thursday, 25 April 2019

Williamson's Metaphysical Modal Epistemology and Vacuism about Counterpossibles

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Timothy Williamson has argued that our capacity for metaphysical modal judgement comes along with our capacity for counterfactual judgement....
2 comments:
Sunday, 7 April 2019

Contradictory Premises and the Notion of Validity

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When evaluating arguments in philosophy, it can be tempting to call an argument 'invalid' if you determine that it has contradictory...
6 comments:
Tuesday, 5 February 2019

Two Sources of Interest in Metaphysical Modality (and Kripke in Light of Them)

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Source 1: We want to know the vocabulary and syntax of being, or as Rosen puts it in 'The Limits of Contingency', 'the combinato...
2 comments:
Thursday, 10 January 2019

Rigidity and General Terms: Two Different Analogues of the Singular Case

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This post wrestles with and begins to settle on a view about the confusing issue of how Kripke's notion of rigidity may apply to genera...
2 comments: