[A substantive distinction between presentism and eternalism] cannot be formulated in nonindexical terms. That is why I have formulated [presentism] with the aid of the indexical 'presently'.
Others have tried with elaborate means
to formulate something which could reasonably be called a
non-indexical version of presentism. Matthew Farr, for example, is
currently exploring a strategy involving two temporal dimensions.
(This note was inspired by a talk he gave at the University of Sydney
on 25/3/13 called 'Supertemporal Ontology and the "Triviality"
Problem'.)
The issue is obviously interesting,
assuming that the question of the meaning of presentism is
interesting. One special connection in which it is interesting is
this: if there is no non-indexical core of presentism, then perhaps
the metaphysical dispute between presentism and non-presentism can be
dissolved, on the grounds that presentism is not a distinctive thesis
about the structure of reality, but something else (a "view from
inside", or something).
I am certainly sympathetic to the idea
that the debate in temporal ontology (between presentism, eternalism,
the growing block view etc.) is something which should be dissolved
or transcended. I seriously doubt that this is a debate about some
real subject matter, let alone that it is a debate about some real
subject matter where one of the positions is right and the others
wrong. I think the confusion here is deep, philosophically important,
and deserves to be investigated carefully, not just dismissed.
However, I do not think that the idea that the debate cannot be
formulated non-indexically is a way to make progress on this, because
I think that idea is wrong.
My suggestion here is that we can
analyse presentism as the conjunction of two claims, one of which is
non-indexical and incompatible with eternalism, growing blockism and
shrinking blockism, the other of which is indexical but agreed to by
all these parties.
(P) Only the present moment exists.
may be analysed as
(P-conj) Only one moment exists, and
this moment exists (where 'this' indicates the present moment).
Call this the conjunction analysis. The
non-indexical core of presentism, on this suggestion, is simply the
first conjunct: monism about moments (or times, instants, timeslices
or whatever).
This non-indexical core is, of course,
compatible with strange propositions like:
(S) Only one moment exists, and it is
the moment of Napoleon's birth.
But so what? No one believes that, and
everyone (presentist, eternalist, growing blockist, shrinking
blockist) believes that the present moment exists. Forget the label
'presentism' - look at the conjunction analysis, and it becomes clear
that what is really distinctive about this view - i.e. what
distinguishes it from other actual contenders - is its monism.
Reference
Hinchliff, M. 2000. 'A defense of
presentism in a relativistic setting', Philosophy of Science 67, pp.
S575-S586.
